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NOTES
Compulsory Party Joinder and Tribal Sovereign Immunity:
A Proposal to Modify Federal Courts' Application of Rule
19 to Cases Involving Absent Tribes as "Necessary"
Parties
I. Introduction
Because "[m]odern federal civil procedure stresses the virtues of avoiding
multiple suits and potentially inconsistent verdicts,"' Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure implements the doctrine of compulsory party
joinder.' The rule seeks not only to "identify nonparties whose joinder is
necessary for a just adjudication," but also to secure the joinder of such
parties.3 Thus, if an absent party is necessary for the disposition of the suit
and joinder is "feasible," joinder of the party is compulsory. However, if the
absent party is necessary and joinder is not feasible, Rule 19 requires
dismissal if the party is deemed "indispensable."4
Numerous courts apply Rule 19 to bar suits in which Indian tribes are
"indispensable parties" because of some tribal interest involved in the suit.
"As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution... Indian tribes have
long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." 5 Thus, joinder of an Indian tribe
is not "feasible" unless the tribe has waived its immunity. Consequently, if
the suit involves "tribal contractual, lease, property, or treaty rights, rights to
govern the reservation, or the validity of tribal constitutional provisions,"
courts often declare the absent tribes "indispensable."6 This finding requires
1. Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal
Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 10611 1061 (1985).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (the tide of Rule 19 is "Joinder of Persons Needed for Just
Adjudication").
3. Id. at 1062.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) ("If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot
be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action
should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable.").
5. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 58 (1978).
6. Timothy W. Joranko, Tribal Self-Determination Unfettered: Toward a Rule ofAbsolute
Tribal Official Immunity from Damages in Federal Court, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 987, 1009-10
(1994) (citations omitted).
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dismissal under Rule 19, leaving plaintiffs without any available forum in
which to seek relief.
7
In Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton,8 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of a suit for failure to join
Indian tribes as indispensable parties under Rule 19.' The court held that the
absent tribes were necessary and indispensable to the action,10 but that it could
notjoin them as defendants because of their sovereign immunity."' Therefore,
although dismissal would leave the plaintiff with no available forum in which
to seek relief, the court affirmed the district court's decision.'
2
This note first argues that many courts, including the Citizen Potawatomi
Nation court, misapply Rule 19(b) in cases involving absent tribes as
necessary parties and governmental agencies as defendants by giving
insufficient weight to the federal government's ability, and duty, to represent
the interests of absent tribes. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this
note argues that litigants and courts overlook alternative procedural
mechanisms that could resolve the majority of Rule 19 issues. Indeed, the
interests served by Rule 19 are often better achieved through the use of these
other mechanisms. 3 While problems may still arise where the litigants fail to
employ these mechanisms, the Rule 19 application proposed herein would
allow courts to consider the resulting prejudice to litigants when determining
7. The remainder of this note focuses on courts' current applications of Rule 19 as denying
plaintiffs a "legal remedy," i.e., the ability to have their dispute resolved by a court of justice.
Although Rule 19(b) requires only that plaintiffs "have an adequate [alternative] remedy," see
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b), few courts have found that plaintiffs actually would have an adequate
alternative remedy if the court dismissed the suit. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 121. Rather,
a majority has found the opposite, focusing on the fact that the tribe's sovereign immunity bars
the dispute in any forum. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 123. Even if a tribe would consent
to suit in its tribal court, tribal court would not have jurisdiction over all parties involved. For
example, the vast majority of cases involve suits against the U.S. government in which one or
more absent tribes are deemed "necessary" and "indispensable" parties. In such cases, either
the government or an absent tribe can assert its sovereign immunity, see infra Part III, to bar the
suit in any tribal court. Indeed, as the majority of courts have acknowledged, the plaintiff
actually has no "adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder." FED. R. Cry. P.
19(b). Therefore, this note's concern is that courts should afford the current litigants their day
in court. It contends that certain procedural mechanisms are available that not only afford the
current parties a "legal remedy" but also often better serve the interests of Rule 19.
8. 248 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2001).
9. Id. at 1002.
10. Id. at 999-1001.
11. Id. at 1001.
12. Id. at 1002.
13. See infra Part VI.B discussing the following procedural mechanisms: intervention,





whether to dismiss under Rule 19. As a result, courts could often allow
plaintiffs' suits to proceed rather than simply dismissing them and forcing the
plaintiffs to suffer the consequences.
Part HI of this note outlines Rule 19 and its application in federal courts.
Part II explains the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its applicability to
Indian tribes. Part IV discusses the existing case law in which courts have
applied Rule 19 to absent tribes. Part V outlines the facts, procedural history,
holding, and reasoning of Citizen Potawatomi Nation. Finally, Part VI.A
demonstrates that federal courts, like the Citizen Potawatomi Nation court,
misapply Rule 19(b) by failing to give sufficient weight to the ability of
governmental defendants to represent absent tribes' interests - an ability that
may reduce or even eliminate the prejudice that the tribes might otherwise
suffer. Part VI.B analyzes other procedural mechanisms that litigants and
federal courts could employ to resolve the Rule 19 problems that arise in cases
involving absent tribes as necessary parties.
I. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
A. Rule's Purpose
Rule 19 stems from the equity principle providing that "a court of equity,
once it undertakes a case, will not do justice 'by halves' but will seek to clean
up the whole controversy."' 4 The rule enables courts to adjudicate an entire
dispute in a single action and to provide complete relief for the parties,
thereby avoiding multiple, or piecemeal, litigation.' 5 Indeed, compulsory
party joinder works "to protect the interests of the parties by affording them
a complete adjudication of their dispute" and also serves society's interest in
"judicial economy by avoiding repeated lawsuits involving the same subject
matter.""6 In fact, the rule serves "three classes of interests ... : '(1) the
interests of the present [parties]; (2) the interests of potential but absent
plaintiffs and defendants; [and] (3) [society's] interest in the orderly,
expeditious administration of justice.""' 7 Basically, the rule seeks to ensure
14. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.11 (5th ed. 2001); see also
Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 184 U.S. 199, 235 (1902) ("The general rule in equity is that all
persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-matter of a suit, are
to be made parties to it, so that there may be a complete decree, which shall bind them all.");
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209,
1220 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[T]he concept of joinder was created to resolve the problem of
conflicting exercise of equity jurisdiction."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. GTE Sylvania,
Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980).
15. HB Gen. Corp. v. Manchester Partners, L.P., 95 F.3d 1185, 1198 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996).
16. Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D. Del. 1978).
17. Tankersley v. Albright, 514 F.2d 956, 965 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting John W. Reed,
2003]
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that (1) all parties interested in the outcome of the suit have a chance to affect
the outcome and (2) the judgment rendered is a "complete, consistent, and
efficient settlement of the controvers[y]."'"
In 1966, Congress amended Rule 19 to require courts to rely on pragmatic
rather than formulaic considerations when resolving joinder problems.' 9 To
ensure that courts rely on such considerations, the Advisory Committee
suggested "four factors in subdivision (b)" to aid in determining whether to
proceed in a party's absence or to dismiss the suit entirely.20 Notably, the
committee did not intend to exclude additional context-based factors from
consideration. 2' Indeed, the committee found that, when determining whether
to dismiss a case for nonjoinder, a court must base its decision "on factors
varying with the different cases, some such factors being substantive, some
procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing
against opposing interests. 2 The 1966 amendment thus requires courts to
rely on practical considerations when initially deciding whether an absent
party "is a person to be joined if feasible" under Rule 19(a) and whether to
dismiss an action for failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 19(b).23
The following section discusses what modem courts consider when applying
Rule 19.
B. Application of Rule 19
Under Rule 19, courts apply a three-step process to determine whether to
dismiss an action for failure to join a purportedly indispensable party. First,
courts determine whether the absent party's presence is "necessary."24 If not,
Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 330 (1957)).
18. Id. at 968.
19. Jean F. Rydstrom, Who Must Be Joined in Action as Persons 'Needed for Just
Adjudication' Under Rule 19(A), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.L.R. FED. 765, § 4,
at 775 (1975) [hereinafter Rydstrom, Who Must Be Joined].
20. Jean F. Rydstrom, Validity, Construction, and Application of Rule 19(B) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as Amended in 1966, Providing for Determination to be Made by
Court to Proceed With orDismissAction when Joinder of Person Neededfor Just Adjudication
is Not Feasible, 21 A.L.R. FED. 12, § 3, at 23 (1974) [hereinafter Rydstrom, Validity].
21. Id.
22. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 119 (1968).
23. Rydstrom, Who Must Be Joined, supra note 19, § 4, at 776.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power
Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002); Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d
993, 997 (10th Cir. 2001); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Kearney, 212 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 2000);
Laker Airways, Inc. v. British Airways, 182 F.3d 843,847 (11th Cir. 1999); Shetter v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 14 F.3d 934, 938 (3d Cir. 1994); Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan, 11




the motion to dismiss is denied.25 Second, if the party's presence is necessary,
courts determine whether joinder of the absent party is "feasible. 26 If so, the
party is compelled to join.2 1 "Finally, if joinder is not 'feasible,' [courts
determine] whether the absent party is 'indispensable' ..... 28 If so, they must
dismiss the suit.29 The party moving forjoinder or dismissal for failure to join
bears the burden of demonstrating that joinder is necessary and feasible and
that the absent party is indispensable.3 °
1. "Necessary" Parties
The courts' initial determination concerns whether the absent party is a
necessary party as defined by Rule 19(a). A person is a necessary party if "(1)
in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties;"'" "(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and... disposition of the action in the person's absence may...
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest; ' '12 or (3) "the
person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and . . .
disposition of the action in the person's absence may... leave... [the current
parties] subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. '33 "There is no
precise formula for determining whether a particular nonparty" is necessary
to an action; "[tihe determination is heavily influenced by the facts and
circumstances of each case."34
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) (stating that action should be dismissed for failure to join an
indispensable party only if, inter alia, absent party is a necessary party as described in
subdivision (a)(1)-(2) of the rule).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1159; Citizen Potawatomi Nation,
248 F.3d at 997; Kearney, 212 F.3d at 724; Laker Airways, 182 F.3d at 848; Shetter, 14 F.3d
at 938; Keweenaw Bay, 11 F.3d at 1345.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) ("If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that
the person be made a party.").
28. United States v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1999); see also FED. R. CIv. P.
19(b); Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1155; Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 997; Kearney,
212 F.3d at 725; Laker Airways, 182 F.3d at 847; Shetter, 14 F.3d at 938; Keweenaw Bay, 11
F.3d at 1345.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); Patterson, 390 U.S. at 118-19; Kearney, 212 F.3d at 725; Davis
v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 959 (10th Cir. 1999).
30. Davis, 192 F.3d at 958; Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Mem'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.3d
1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1996); Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990);
Third Ave. Trust v. Suntrust Bank, 163 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
31. FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a)(1).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii).
34. Bakia v. County of Los Angeles, 687 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982).
20031
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In determining whether they can afford complete relief in the party's
absence, courts base their decisions on the interests of the persons already
parties to the lawsuit in isolation and not in relation to the absent party.35
"The possibility that the successful party to the original litigation might have
to defend against a subsequent suit by the receiver does not make the receiver
a necessary party to the action. 36 Thus, courts focus on administering relief
among the present parties "and not on the speculative possibilit[ies] of further
litigation between a party and an absent person."37
Rule 19 requires only that the absent party assert a nonfrivolous,38 legally
protected interest in the suit to be deemed a necessary party. 39 The rule does
not require that the absent party actually possess the legal interest, only that
it claim a legal interest relating to the suit.4 ° A majority of courts require more
than a speculative interest about future events or more than a mere financial
or convenience interest.4 For example, joint and several liability between a
named party and an absent person is insufficient to deem the absent party a
necessary party.4 2 However, if "federal litigation would have a preclusive
35. Angst v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 701, 705 (3d Cit. 1996).
36. Id.
37. LLC Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 703 F.2d 301,305 (8th Cir. 1983); Morgan
Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Martin, 466 F.2d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2001); Davis v.
United States, 192 F.3d 951,959 (10th Cir. 1999); Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312,
1318 (9th Cir. 1992).
39. See United States v. San Juan Bay Marina, 239 F.3d 400, 406 (1st Cir. 2001);
Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1317 ("Just adjudication of claims requires that courts protect a party's
right to be heard and to participate in adjudication of a claimed interest, even if the dispute is
ultimately resolved to the detriment of that party."). But see Iron Workers Local Union No. 17
Ins. Fund v. Phillip Morris Inc., 182 F.R.D. 512, 517-18 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that the
interest "need not be a 'legal interest,' but rather need only be a 'claim to an interest' that is
'sufficiently "related to" the subject of the action') (quoting Local 670, United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum and Plastic Workers v. Int'l Union, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic
Workers, 822 F.2d 613, 620 (6th Cir. 1987)); see also Local 670, United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum and Plastic Workers v. Int'l Union, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic
Workers, 822 F.2d 613, 620 (6th Cir. 1987).
40. Davis, 192 F.3d at 958.
41. Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150,
1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002); Coregis Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 180 F.R.D. 280, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1998);
United States v. Nye County, 951 F. Supp. 1502, 1513 (D. Nev. 1996); see also S. Co. Energy
Mktg., L.P. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 190 F.R.D. 182, 185 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("A party is not
necessary simply because joinder would be convenient, or because two claims share common
facts, for that would render the distinction between permissive joinder under Rule 20 [of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], and joinder under Rule 19 'practically meaningless."').
42. See Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 460, 463 (S.D.W. Va. 2001); see also
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 817 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Rule 19, as amended in 1966, was not




effect [on an] absent party in subsequent state litigation," joinder is
compulsory because preclusion impairs or impedes the absent party's ability
to protect its interest in the subject matter of the litigation. 3 In sum,
"necessary parties are those ... against which a court's judgment will in fact
operate."'
Despite having a legally protected interest, an absent party is not a
necessary party if (1) the interests of the existing parties are such that they
would undoubtedly make all of the nonparty's arguments; (2) the existing
parties are willing and able to make such arguments"'; and (3) the nonparty
cannot provide any necessary element to the proceedings that the existing
parties would omit. 5 "If the nonparties' interests are adequately represented
by a party, the suit will not impede or impair the nonparties' interests, and
therefore the nonparties will not be considered 'necessary."' 46 However, if
any significant conflict exists between the interest of a party and the interest
of the nonparty, representation is not adequate, and a court must declare the
nonparty necessary.47
2. Feasibility of Joinder
Once the court determines that an absent party's presence is necessary, it
must determine whetherjoinder is feasible, which is a question ofjurisdiction.
Rule 19 does not extend or confer jurisdiction.48 Thus, joinder is feasible only
if absent parties are subject to service of process, and their joinder will not
deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.49 Courts most commonly
determine that joinder is infeasible when jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship between the original parties.50 However, sovereign immunity also
renders joinder infeasible. When a sovereign such as an Indian tribe asserts
coconspirators are not persons whose absence from a case will result in dismissal for non-
joinder.").
43. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399,409 (3d Cir. 1993).
44. W. Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
45. Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cit. 1992); see Southwest Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 1998); Ramah Navajo Sch.
Bd. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
46. Ramah, 87 F.3d at 1351.
47. See Cherokee Nation v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that,
although the interests of the absent tribe and the United States are currently the same, the United
States has previously reversed its position and could do so again, that the United States does not
have to appeal any unfavorable decision, and that, as a nonparty, the absent tribe has no right
to appeal).
48. Rydstrom, Who Must Be Joined, supra note 19, § 5(b), at 782-83.
49. Id. § 9, at 797.
50. Id. § 5(b), at 782.
20031
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its immunity, all suits against the sovereign are barred absent an unequivocal
waiver by the sovereign or an abrogation by Congress. 1 Thus, when the
absent party is immune, joinder is infeasible, and the courts must determine
whether the absent party is indispensable.
3. Indispensability
If a court determines that joinder is infeasible, it must then analyze whether
the absent party is indispensable. An absent party is indispensable if, "in
equity and good conscience," the court cannot allow the action to proceed in
its absence. 2 No prescribed formula exists to determine whether a person is
an indispensable party because courts can only determine such a matter in the
context of the particular litigation.53 However, Rule 19 provides four factors
for courts to consider in making this determination: (1) the prejudice to the
existing parties or the absent party; (2) whether the court can shape relief to
lessen the prejudice; (3) whether the court can award an adequate remedy
among the existing parties without the absent party; and (4) whether an
alternative forum exists in which the plaintiff can obtain an adequate remedy
if the court dismisses the action for nonjoinder.54 The Advisory Committee
intended the first factor, extent of prejudice, to force courts to consider the
51. See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d
1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity renderedjoinder unfeasible);
Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951,959 n.8 (10th Cir. 1999); Native Am. Mohegans v. United
States, 184 F. Supp. 2d 198, 210, 217 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding that sovereign immunity
rendered joinder of both State and Indian Tribe infeasible).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1155; Citizen Potawatomi Nation v.
Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 997 (10th Cir. 2001); N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642,
648 (7th Cir. 1998).
53. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 (1968).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1161-62; Citizen PotawatomiNation,
248 F.3d at 997. The four factors listed in Rule 19(b) are not the only factors that courts may
consider in determining indispensability. Courts also consider whether a valid, binding
judgment was entered at the trial level; the stage of lawsuit at which the joinder issue was raised;
the consideration of efficiency (i.e., time and expense of previous trial); whether the plaintiff
dropped the defendants from the suit under Rule 21 to secure diversity of citizenship; the
location of an alternative forum and resulting inconvenience to plaintiff; and the ability of the
existing parties to fully represent the absent party's interests. See Rydstrom, Validity, supra
note 20, § 13, at 65-72. Additionally, some courts hold that any absent party to a contract is per
se indispensable to the litigation affecting the contract. See, e.g., Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway,
520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928
F.2d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 1991); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 821 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir.
1987); Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 862 F. Supp. 995,
1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). In sum, the rule requires that courts take into account any and all




judgment's effect on the absent party.5 Courts must determine whether, as a
practical matter, the judgment affects the absent party and, if so, whether the
effect will be "immediate and serious, or remote and minor."56 The second
factor, the extent to which the court can avoid prejudice, requires the court to
consider all available relief measures to avert or lessen the prejudice and to
accommodate the interests of the existing parties, the absent party, and the
courts' and the public's interest "in efficient judicial administration."57 The
third factor- adequacy of the judgment - directs the court's attention to the
extent that it can actually provide effective relief among the existing parties
and still avoid repeated or multiple lawsuits.58 The fourth factor - adequacy
of plaintiffs remedy upon dismissal - requires the court to determine
whether an alternative forum exists in which the plaintiff can sue and obtain
effective relief 9 Generally, the absence of an alternative forum outweighs
the resulting prejudice from the court proceeding in the party's absence.6°
When applying Rule 19 to cases involving Indian tribes, courts generally
dismiss suits because the tribes' sovereign immunity renders joinder
infeasible. The following discussion describes the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and its application to Indian tribes.
I1. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
A. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity, also known as "freedom from suit," is a common-law
concept rooted in "the English concept of the divine right of royalty."61 Under
such a conception, "the monarch could do no wrong and therefore no suit
against the monarchy could be legitimate."62 In the United States, however,
sovereign immunity stems from the idea that subjecting the government to
suits would prevent it from "performing its essential functions. '"63
The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects both national and state
governments. 6 As sovereigns, both governments retain the power "to define
55. Rydstrom, Validity, supra note 20, § 9, at 39.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 10(a), at 50; see also Patterson, 390 U.S. at 111.
58. Rydstrom, Validity, supra note 20, § 11 (a), at 55.
59. Id. § 12(a), at 58-59.
60. Id.
61. Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The Evolution of Tribal Immunity, 24 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 99, 101 (1999-2000).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect
2003] 939
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when and under what circumstances" they will subject themselves to suit.65
The federal government is sovereign, and "immunity is an inherent attribute
of [that] sovereignty. ' 66 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has noted the
doctrine's lack of authoritative roots ,67 it is .' embodied in the Constitution.'
68
As to the states, the Eleventh Amendment "prohibits suits against the states"
in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that states' sovereign
immunity also applies in state court.6 9 Regardless of the doctrine's origins,
"[tihe Court has held that the Constitution prohibits suits against states in
federal [or state] court by a state's own citizens, by citizens of another
state .... by citizens of other countries.... by foreign nations and by [Indian]
tribes."70
The doctrine of sovereign immunity also applies to Indian tribes. Like the
national and state governments, Indian tribes are sovereign entities and
therefore possess similar powers of sovereign immunity.
B. Development of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
1. Sovereign Immunity as an Element of Tribal Sovereignty
Society has long regarded Indian tribes as separate sovereigns. Indeed,
"'[a]t the time of European discovery of America, the tribes were sovereign
by nature and necessity; they conducted their own affairs and depended on no
outside source of power to legitimize their acts of government."'" Thus, for
all practical purposes, the European settlers and the British Crown treated the
Indians as sovereigns possessing full ownership rights to the American lands.72
"Early in [our] nation's history, the ... United States ...recognized
[Indians] as separate sovereigns whose existence necessitated nation-to-nation
diplomacy and treaty-making."73 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,74 Justice
Marshall best described the tribes' sovereignty:
of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 669 (2002).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 670.
67. Id. at 670 n.30 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882)).
68. Id. at 670 n.29 (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573,
580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
69. Wilson, supra note 61, at 102 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
70. Seielstad, supra note 64, at 674 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 683 (quoting WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 68
(3d ed. 1998)).
72. Id. at 684.
73. Id.




Indian tribes are 'distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local self-
government. Although no longer 'possessed of the full attributes
of sovereignty,' they remain a 'separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations.' They have the power
to make their own substantive law in internal matters, and to
enforce that law in their own forums."
Thus, as self-governing peoples whose presence in American pre-existed the
drafting of the Constitution, Indian tribes enjoy the inherent sovereignty
provided by their pre-constitutional establishment of self-government.
The legal foundation for the tribes' sovereign status is traced to a trio of
Supreme Court cases known as the "Marshall Trilogy,"76 in which the Court
acknowledged the existence of tribal sovereignty77 and concluded that tribes
are "domestic dependent nations"78 retaining their separate sovereign status
subject to U.S. governmental regulation.79 The Marshall Trilogy provided a
framework for acknowledging and defining basic tribal sovereignty as a matter
of federal law, and the cases that followed built upon that framework,
providing the foundation for the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. 0
2. Modem Doctrine of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity remains firmly entrenched in the
federal common law. "In each of its decisions regarding tribal immunity, the
75. Id. at 55-56 (citations omitted).
76. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
77. Seielstad, supra note 64, at 687.
78. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
79. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
80. See Seielstad, supra note 64, at 688-89.
[Aifter these three early cases several foundational principles are acknowledged
by the Supreme Court: (1) based upon their indigenous claims to land and political
status, tribes enjoy certain sovereignty that preexisted the formation of the United
States of America, and (2) this sovereignty is subject to abrogation or diminution
only by the federal government, not the states. Furthermore, from the latter
principle, together with the Court's determination that the tribes were dependent
upon the United States for protection, the principle that the United States owed to
tribes a trust responsibility also emerged as a matter of Supreme Court precedent.
While the sovereignty enjoyed by tribes under early federal common law was not
absolute, the fact that a form of inherent sovereignty was recognized is significant
to the development of other principles of tribal sovereignty such as the doctrine
of tribal immunity.
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[Supreme] Court has consistently upheld the principle that 'an Indian tribe is
subject to suit only where Congress has authorized suit or the tribe has waived
its immunity.'". Today, the doctrine protects tribes from suit in federal, state,
and tribal courts. Moreover, tribes are immune whether sued directly or via
cross-claim or counterclaim, whether the activity takes place on or off the
reservation, whether the activity is commercial or noncommercial, and
whether the activity is governmental or nongovernmental. 2 Indeed, "[w]ith
the exception of suits brought by the federal government, tribes maintain
immunity from suit vis-A-vis all other entities." 3 Tribes cannot assert their
sovereign immunity against the United States because, as "domestic dependant
nations,"8 4 the tribes' sovereign powers are inferior to those of the U.S.
government.85 Nonetheless, unless Congress exercises its authority to limit or
reform the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, 6 tribes remain largely
immune from suit.
In sum, "Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
powers."8" Unless tribes waive their immunity or Congress abrogates it, they
cannot be haled into court. Thus, courts cannot join tribes to a lawsuit, even
if they are deemed "necessary" under Rule 19(a). Indeed, sovereign immunity
renders joinder infeasible, causing numerous courts to apply Rule 19 to bar
suits involving various interests of Indian tribes. The result is that plaintiffs
are left without any available forum in which to seek relief.
81. Id. at 699 (quoting Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 752 (1998)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
85. See United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir.
1987) ("[It is an inherent implication of the superior power exercised by the United States over
the Indian tribes that a tribe may not interpose its sovereign immunity against the United
States."); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 1986)
("The Tribe's own sovereignty does not extend to preventing the federal government from
exercising its superior sovereign powers."); see also Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1135 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity
does not bar suits by the United States); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174,
182 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).
86. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("Congress has plenary
authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes
otherwise possess."). While Congress' power over the tribes is plenary, it exercises its power
in regulating tribal sovereign immunity conservatively and has abrogated or limited tribal
sovereign immunity in few specific contexts. See Seielstad, supra note 64, at 717-51
(discussing congressional legislation regarding tribal affairs and its effect on tribal sovereign
immunity).




IV. Cases Applying Rule 19 to Absent Tribes
Courts have applied Rule 19 in numerous cases involving absent Indian
tribes.88 In virtually every case, once courts deem the absent tribe a necessary
88. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (racetrack
owners brought suit to enjoin Arizona governor from entering new, renewed, or modified
gaming compacts with absent Indian tribes); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (employee brought Title VII action
against employer challenging employment preferences that employer is required to give to
qualified members of absent Indian tribe pursuant to employer's lease with tribe); Kansas v.
United States, 249 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2001) (state brought suit against National Indian
Gaming Commission (NIGC) and others challenging the NIGC's decision declaring land leased
by absent tribe "Indian Lands" for purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); Sac & Fox
Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001) (Indian tribes and Kansas sued to prevent
Secretary of the Interior from taking a tract of land into trust on behalf of absent Indian tribe and
approving gaming activities on tract); Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951 (10th Cir. 1999)
(certain bands of absent tribe brought action against the Secretary of the Interior challenging
Secretary's exclusion of bands from Judgment Fund Programs and refusal to issue Certificates
of Degree of Indian Blood to members of the bands); Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081 (9th
Cir. 1999) (Navajo tribe members brought suit against Secretary of the Interior to challenge
Secretary's approval of leases with absent tribe); Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir.
1999) (State sued Secretary of Commerce challenging fishing regulations that allocated fish to
absent tribes); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1998)
(environmental organization brought suit against Secretary of the Interior alleging that approved
use of water storage facility, in which absent tribe stored water, violated the National
Environmental Policy Act); Cherokee Nation v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Cherokee Nation sued Secretary of the Interior challenging Secretary's decision to recognize
absent tribe as a federally recognized tribe); Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 1996)
(individual member of absent tribe brought suit challenging Secretary of the Interior's approval
of settlement agreement between absent tribe and coal mining company); United States ex rel.
Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1996) (Qui tam action to invalidate sales and
lease contracts for gambling equipment and supplies to absent tribe); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd.,
Inc. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (tribal school board brought suit against
Secretary of the Interior challenging Secretary's allocation of funds among tribe and other
absent tribes); Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994)
(group of Indian families sued Secretary of the Interior challenging Secretary's decision granting
beneficial ownership of real property to absent tribe); Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan,
11 F.3d 1341 (6th Cir. 1993) (one band of tribe sued State disputing fishing rights granted to
band and absent bands of same tribe); State of South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.
1991) (state brought suit against officials of absent tribe seeking to enjoin them from regulating
hunting and fishing activities of non-Indians); Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555 (9th
Cir. 1990) (tribe brought suit challenging federal regulations allocating fishing rights among
tribe and other absent tribes); McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1989)
(lessees sued United States and Indian tribe for breach of lease agreement); Manygoats v.
Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977) (members of absent tribe sued to enjoin performance
under lease agreement between tribe and corporation); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d
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party under Rule 19(a), it dismisses the suit on the basis that joinder is
infeasible and the absent tribe is "indispensable" to the action. 9
A. Absent Tribes as Necessary Parties
Many courts have held that absent tribes are necessary parties to a lawsuit
under Rule 19(a).' In so holding, courts have found that (1) complete relief
cannot be accorded to the present parties in the tribes' absence;9' (2) the
absent tribes can claim a nonfrivolous interest in the suit and, as such,
disposition in their absence would impair or impede the tribes' ability to
protect this interest;92 and/or (3) disposition in the tribes' absence will subject
1324 (9th Cir. 1975) (tribal faction leaders brought suit to invalidate lease of tribal land to coal-
mining company); Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974) (class action by
members of absent tribe against Secretary of the Interior challenging Secretary's approval of
lease between the tribe and a developer).
89. For an exception, see Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 558-59. In Manygoats, the court held
that an absent tribe was a necessary party and joinder was infeasible due to the tribe's sovereign
immunity. However, the court concluded that the tribe was not indispensable because, even if
plaintiffs prevail, the result would only require additional action by the Secretary of the Interior.
Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs would not call for any action by or against the tribe.
90. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1023; Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1159;
Davis, 192 F.3d at 959; Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1089; Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 1309; Tribal Dev.
Corp., 100 F.3d at 478-79; Pit River, 30 F.3d at 1099; Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d 559;
Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1325.
91. See, e.g., Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1155-56 (finding that absent tribes would not be
bound by the judgment and could seek to enforce the lease provision in tribal court, rendering
the plaintiff without complete relief even if victorious); Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1088 (finding that
it could not provide relief to current parties because absent tribe was a party to the lease in
question); Pit River, 30 F.3d at 1099 (finding that complete relief could not be accorded because
the judgment would not bind the absent tribe, which could later assert its rights to the property).
92. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1023-24 (finding that disposition would
impair (1) tribe's claimed interest in existing gaming compact because current litigation would
foreclose tribe's right to renew compacts and (2) tribes' sovereign power to negotiate compacts);
Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1157 (finding that (1) "the instant litigation threatens to impair the
[tribe's] contractual interests, and thus, its fundamental economic relationship with [the other
party to the contract]" and (2) the judgment would impair absent tribe's capacity to negotiate
contracts and govern the reservation effectively and efficiently); Davis, 192 F.3d at 959 (finding
that "[t]he Tribe's claimed interest in determining eligibility requirements and adopting
ordinances embodying those requirements is neither fabricated nor frivolous. The disposition
of Plaintiffs' . . . claim in the Tribe's absence will impair or impede the Tribe's ability to
protect its claimed interest."); Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1089 (finding that the requested declaration
would prohibit absent tribe from fulfilling its obligation to enter into lease, deprive the tribe of
substantial compensation, and impair tribe's interest in regaining jurisdiction over tribal land);
Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 1310 (finding that plaintiff's action could affect the absent tribes' interests
in lease agreements and their ability to obtain bargained-for royalties and jobs); Tribal Dev.
Corp., 100 F.3d at 479 ("As a party to the lease contracts at issue here, the Tribe has a




the present parties to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent
obligations because of the claimed interest.93  Some courts have held,
however, that the absent tribe is not a necessary party in cases involving the
United States as the defendant, finding that the United States could adequately
represent the tribe's interest because of its trust obligation to the tribes. 94 In
Washington v. Daley,95 for example, the State of Washington sued the
Secretary of Commerce to invalidate regulations that allocated fishing rights
to four absent Indian tribes.96 Despite finding that the absent tribes possessed
an interest in the subject of the suit because, if the plaintiffs prevailed, the
tribes would lose their fishing rights,97 the court concluded that the tribes were
not necessary parties.9" The court reasoned that the United States could
adequately represent tribal interests99 because the government and the absent
tribes did not disagree on the issues, and the government's trust obligation to
the tribes obligated it to protect their interests."°° Consequently, the court
plaintiff's action seeking ownership of real property would impair absent tribe's interest in
retaining ownership of the property and preserving its sovereign immunity). But see Ramah,
87 F.3d at 1351 (holding that tribes do not have a legally protected interest in the suit because,
due to "the large hassle and negligible benefits .... the released funds 'most definitely would
not be used to increase existing contracts to a higher funding level"') (quoting Aff. of Daisy
West, Indian Self-Determination Analyst for the BIA at 2, Ramah (No. 95-5348)).
93. See, e.g., Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1158 (finding that the judgment would not bind
the absent tribe, which could continue to enforce the lease, subjecting current defendant to
"intractable, mutually exclusive alternatives" and a "substantial risk of facing multiple,
inconsistent obligations"); Pit River, 30 F.3d at 1099 ("A judgment for the [plaintiff] finding
a fiduciary duty owed to the [plaintiff] by the government would subject the government to
additional multiple or inconsistent obligations.").
94. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 1213, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that
interests of the federal agency defendants, tribal officials, and other contracting party,
"considered together, are substantially similar, if not identical, to the Tribe's interests in
upholding the NIGC's decision"); Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1259 (10th Cir.
2001) ("As a practical matter, the Secretary's interest in defending his determinations is
'virtually identical' to the interests of the [absent tribe]."); Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158,
1167-68 (9th Cir. 1999) ("There is no conflict of interest between the federal defendants and
the Tribes in the instant matter. In fact, the Secretary and the Tribes have virtually identical
interests in this regard.") (citation omitted); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
150 F.3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the Secretary of the Interior and absent tribe
"share a strong interest in defeating" the plaintiffs suit and, therefore, that the Secretary can
adequately represent the tribe's interest); Ramah, 87 F.3d at 1351 (finding no conflict between
interests of the absent tribe and Secretary of the Interior).
95. 173 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1999).
96. Id. at 1161.
97. Id. at 1167.
98. Id. at 1169.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1168.
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found that "[t]he Tribes are not necessary parties because there is no direct
conflict between the federal defendants and the Tribes, or between the Tribes
themselves."' 1 Thus, in cases where the government's interests are, as a
practical matter, the same as the absent tribes' interests, the tribes are not
necessary parties.'0 2 Conversely, if the interests of the absent tribes conflict
with the interests of the United States, the tribe is a necessary party.
0 3
Furthermore, in cases involving multiple tribes, courts have concluded that the
federal government cannot adequately represent the absent tribes because the
absent tribes' interests could potentially conflict with each other.'4
B. Feasibility of Joining Absent Tribes
Courts labeling absent tribes as necessary parties have recognized that tribal
sovereign immunity prevents them from joining the tribes as parties to the
lawsuit.'0 5 In fact, parties rarely contest feasibility ofjoinder because litigants
acknowledge that tribal sovereign immunity protects tribes from suit unless
101. Id. at 1169.
102. Id. at 1167.
103. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding
that the federal government's interests might diverge from those of the absent tribes because,
although they currently share the same interests, the United States has reversed its position twice
and may reverse itself again); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d 476, 479
(7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the presence of the United States did not alleviate the concerns of
Rule 19(a) "given the Tribe's unwillingness to join the present action"); Manygoats v. Kleppe,
558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding that the United States could not represent the tribe's
interests because national interest in enforcing National Environment Policy Act may conflict
with absent tribe's interests in benefits received from agreement with Exxon); see also Am.
Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1023 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the state
governor could not adequately represent absent tribe's interests because "the State and the tribes
have often been adversaries in disputes over gaming, and the State owes no trust duty to the
tribes").
104. See, e.g., Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1101 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that the United States could not represent absent tribe because case involved
intertribal conflicts that could subject the United States to inconsistent duties or obligations);
Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the United States
could not adequately represent the interests of nonparty tribes where "competing interests and
divergent concerns of the tribes" might conflict with the United States' role as trustee); Makah
Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555,560 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the United States could
not represent the interests of all absent tribes because of "potential intertribal conflicts"); see
also Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 2001); Cherokee
Nation, 117 F.3d at 1497; Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 558.
105. See, e.g., Am. GreyhoundRacing, 305 F.3d at 1022; Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project
Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002); Kescoli v. Babbitt,
101 F.3d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1996); Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341,
1347 (6th Cir. 1993); Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 557-58; Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d




the tribes consent or Congress abrogates their immunity. 6 Thus, joinder is
not feasible, and courts have been forced to analyze whether the tribes are
indispensable parties.
C. Indispensability of Absent, Necessary Tribes
In virtually all cases in which courts have declared an absent tribe a
necessary party, the courts have also declared the tribe indispensable. 7 In
applying the factors provided in Rule 19(b) to the absent tribes, courts
generally have found that the first three factors support dismissal and that the
fourth factor - the plaintiffs lack of an adequate alternative remedy -
weighs against dismissal because the tribe's sovereign immunity bars the suit
in any forum.
When applying the first factor, courts have invariably found that the absent
tribe will suffer prejudice if the case proceeds. 10 8 While judgment in the
tribe's absence does not bind the tribe,0 9 as a practical matter it does have an
effect on the tribe stemming from the same interest that makes the absent tribe
106. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951,959 n.8 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Plaintiffs do
not argue the Tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived by the Tribe or abrogated by
Congress. Consequently, that issue is not before this court.") (citations omitted).
107. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1025; Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1163;
Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1999); Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 1311; Pit
River, 30 F.3d at 1103; Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1325 ("No procedural principle is more
deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease or contract, all
parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are indispensable."); Tewa
Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240, 242-43 (10th Cir. 1974).
108. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1025 (finding that tribes would be
prejudiced by required termination of the gaming compacts); Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1162
(finding that a decision would prejudice (1) the absent tribe's economic interests in the lease and
sovereign interests in negotiating contractual obligations and governing the reservation; and (2)
the defendant, by leaving defendant facing an irreconcilable conflict between its obligations to
the plaintiffand the absent tribe); Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1090; Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 1311 (finding
that prejudice would result to tribe by virtue of its interest as a party to the lease and settlement
agreements); Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d at 479 (finding that prejudice would result to tribe
because tribe is a party to the lease contracts that plaintiff seeks to void); Pit River, 30 F.3d at
1101 (finding that a judgment granting the plaintiffs rights to the property or finding that the
government owes plaintiffs a duty would prejudice the tribe's right to self-government);
Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1326 (finding that tribe's interest in receiving royalties and gaining
employment for members under the lease is prejudiced if case proceeds in tribe's absence);
Tewa Tesuque, 498 F.2d at 242 (finding that absent tribe would lose rental income and
employment opportunities for members if lease were cancelled).
109. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1024 (recognizing that absent tribes "are
not bound by [the court's] ruling under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel because
they are not parties" and could therefore relitigate the issues free of such constraints).
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a "necessary" party under Rule 19(a).1" ° For example, in Dawavendewa v.
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District,"' the court
held that an absent tribe was a necessary party under Rule 19(a) because the
tribe had a legally protected interest in a contract with the defendant." 2
Because of this contractual interest, the court concluded that the tribe would
suffer prejudice if the court rendered a decision in the tribe's absence." 3 The
court explained that "[t]he prejudice to the [tribe] stems from the same
impairment of legal interests that makes the [tribe] a necessary party under
Rule 19(a)(2)(i).. '".4 However, although courts rarely consider the govern-
ment' s presence as a party in their indispensability analysis," 5 the presence of
the United States may function to offset the potential prejudice." 16 Thus,
because the government's presence frequently offsets or at least substantially
decreases the potential for prejudice to the absent tribe, the balance of the
indispensability factors could shift against dismissal.' Unfortunately, most
courts have ignored the government's presence when conducting the Rule
19(b) analysis. Upon finding that the absent tribe will suffer prejudice, most
courts have simply concluded that the prejudice is unavoidable." 8 In cases
where the potential for prejudice is minimal, courts have found it unnecessary
to consider the second factor." 9 Furthermore, in applying the third factor,
110. See, e.g., id. at 1024-25 ("[T]he first factor of prejudice, insofar as it focuses on the
absent party, largely duplicates the consideration that made a party necessary under Rule
19(a) .... "); Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1090 ("[Plrejudice stems from the same legal interests
making someone a necessary party to the action."); Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d at 479 (same).
111. 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).
112. Id. at 1156.
113. Id. at 1162.
114. Id.
115. See infra Part VI.A proposing that courts give more weight to the federal government's
ability to represent the absent tribes' interests when conducting an indispensability analysis.
116. See Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that, even if the tribe were a necessary party, the potential for prejudice would be offset in large
part by the presence of Secretary of the Interior's interests in defending his actions).
117. See id. (holding that the potential for prejudice was offset by the government's ability
to represent the absent tribe's interests and, thus, the first and second factors favored
nondismissal because the reduced potential for prejudice eliminated the need to explore "'the
availability of means for lessening or avoiding prejudice"') (quoting Rishell v. Jane Phillips
Episcopal Mem'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.3d 1407, 1412 (10th Cir. 1996)).
118. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 2002);
Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1162; Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999);
Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal
Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d 476,480 (7th Cir. 1996); Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. v. United States,
30 F.3d 1088, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 1994); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th
Cir. 1975); Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240, 242 (10th Cir. 1974).




courts have found that any type of relief is inadequate if prejudice to the tribe
results. 12 Moreover, although a few courts have found that the plaintiff will
have an adequate alternative remedy if the case is dismissed,' 2' the majority
of courts have concluded to the contrary because tribal sovereign immunity
bars the suit in any forum. 2 2 Unfortunately, these courts have concluded that
the tribes' interest in asserting their sovereign immunity outweighs the
plaintiffs' interests in litigating their claims. 123 Thus, although the absence of
an alternative forum outweighs the prejudice that could potentially result to
the absent tribes'24 and weighs heavily against dismissal, 12 courts have
minimal, 'we need not be concerned with the second factor, which addresses the availability of
means for lessening or avoiding prejudice."') (quoting Rishell, 94 F.3d at 1412).
120. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1025 (finding that requested remedy
impairs tribe's interests, and any other relief is inadequate); Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1162;
Pit River, 30 F.3d at 1102; Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1326 (finding that remedies other than
invalidating the lease would be inadequate). But see Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d at 480
(finding that third factor weighs against dismissal because "there is nothing to prevent a court
from ordering [the requested] relief'); Tewa Tesuque, 498 F.2d at 242-43 (finding that judgment
"would not be adequate ... because it may very likely invite additional lawsuits").
121. See, e.g., Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1162-63 (stating that plaintiff may have an
adequate alternative remedy by refiling suit in conjunction with the EEOC because tribe's
sovereign immunity does not apply against the United States, and the EEOC had tried to
intervene and salvage plaintiff s case at the last minute); Pit River, 30 F.3d at 1102 n.9 (noting
that the plaintiff "possibly could pursue a claim for monetary relief under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346"); Tewa Tesuque, 498 F.2d at 243 (holding that the dispute is an internal dispute
and should be resolved by the tribal council and not the courts).
122. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1025; Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1090; Tribal
Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d at 480; Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1326.
123. See Confederated Tribes v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Am.
Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1025 ("[T]ribes' interest in maintaining their sovereign
immunity outweighs the plaintiffs' interest in litigating their claims."); Clinton, 180 F.3d at
1090 ("[T]he [tribe's] interest in maintaining its sovereign immunity outweighs the interest of
the plaintiffs in litigating their claim."); Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 1311 ("[A]lthough the factors were
not clearly in favor of dismissal, the concern for the protection of tribal sovereignty warranted
dismissal."); Pit River, 30 F.3d at 1102 ("In this case, the [tribe's] interest in maintaining its
sovereign immunity outweighs the [plaintiff's] interest in litigating its claim."); Makah Indian
Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[L]ack of an alternative forum does not
automatically prevent dismissal of a suit. Sovereign immunity may leave a party with no forum
for its claims.") (citation omitted); Wichita & Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[Tlhe dismissal turns on the fact that society has consciously opted to shield
Indian tribes from suit without congressional or tribal consent.").
124. See Rydstrom, Validity, supra note 20, § 12(a), at 58-59.
125. See Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Mem'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.3d 1407, 1413 (10th Cir.
1996) ('The absence of an alternative forum would weigh heavily, if not conclusively against
dismissal .... ").
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declared absent tribes indispensable and have dismissed suits, leaving
plaintiffs with no available forum in which to seek legal relief.
This unfortunate result was reached by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton. Using the same mistaken analysis,
employed by numerous other courts, the Norton court applied Rule 19 to bar
a suit involving absent Indian tribes. After applying Rule 19(a) and finding
that the tribes were necessary parties and thatjoinder was not feasible because
of their sovereign immunity,'26 the court failed to consider whether the
government's ability to represent the absent tribes' interests offset the
prejudicial effect of a judgment entered in their absence. Therefore, the court
mistakenly concluded that the tribes were indispensable under Rule 19(b).'27
As a result, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, 12
8
leaving the plaintiff with no forum in which to seek relief. The following
section addresses the Citizen Potawatomi Nation decision.
V. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton
A. Facts and Procedural History
Congress adopted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act 129 in 1975 to provide for tribal self-governance. The Act authorizes the
federal government to enter into compacts with tribes whereby the tribes
receive federal appropriations and "assume comprehensive responsibility for
the planning and administration of programs and services previously provided
by the United States."' 3°
In 1988, five tribes within the Shawnee Agency of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs developed a formula to be used for dividing future federal
appropriations among themselves. 13' The tribes "agreed to divide (1) twenty-
five percent of the funding equally; (2) twenty-five percent in proportion to
total tribal enrollment; (3) twenty-five percent in proportion to resident tribal
enrollment within each tribe's jurisdictional area; and (4) [the remaining]
twenty-five percent of the funds in proportion to the amount of trust property
in each tribe's jurisdiction."' 32 The U.S. Department of the Interior applied
126. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (10th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 1001.
128. Id. at 1002.
129. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000).
130. Citizen Potowatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 995.
131. Id.




the formula to determine the amount of funding to award the tribes
annually.
133
In 1998, one of the tribes, the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (Citizen
Potawatomi), brought suit in the Western District of Oklahoma 34 seeking a
"mandatory injunction in the nature of mandamus" against the Department of
the Interior and its officials.'35 The tribe challenged the methods used for
computing the amount of funding that the Citizen Potawatomi received under
the agreement.136 Although the Citizen Potawatomi challenged four separate
determinations made by the defendants, only two were significant to the
court's Rule 19 analysis: (1) "the determination that the.., formula [was]
static and [did] not change as the data change[d]," and (2) "the determination
that the Shawnee Tribe and the Citizen Potawatomi share[d] the same service
area and ... the funds provided to that area."' 137 The other four tribes that
signed the funding agreement did not participate in the suit. The
"[d]efendants moved to dismiss the action" under Rule 19 "on the ground that
the Citizen Potawatomi had not, and could not, join" the other four absent
tribes "as parties to the action."'138 The defendants argued that the absent
tribes were necessary and indispensable parties and that the court should
therefore dismiss the action under Rule 19.13' The district court agreed and
dismissed the suit. 40 The Citizen Potawatomi appealed."'
B. Holding and Reasoning
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the
absent tribes were necessary parties and that joinder was not feasible. 42 The
133. Id.
134. Id. at 995-96.
135. Id. at 995.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 996. The Citizen Potawatomi also challenged "the refusal of Defendants to fund
certain items of the Citizen Potawatomi that [the] Defendants claim[ed] [were] residual ... and
the Defendants' interpretation of [the] 'moratorium' clause" that allegedly stopped the
Defendants from fully funding the Citizen Potawatomi. Id. However, these claims were not
addressed in the court's analysis under Rule 19 because the absent tribes did not have an interest
in them. Id. at 1001. The Defendants did not meet "their burden ... of 'demonstrating the
Tribe ha[d] an interest in [the] claim and that the Tribe's ability to protect that interest [would]
be impaired or impeded if the suit proceed[ed] in the Tribe's absence."' Id. (quoting Davis v.
United States, 192 F.3d 951, 962 (10th Cir. 1999)).
138. Id. at 996.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 995.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 999-1000.
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court also concluded that the absent tribes were indispensable.'43 Thus, the
court dismissed the suit under Rule 19 even though dismissal meant that the
Citizen Potawatomi had no forum in which to seek relief.'"
1. Necessary Party Analysis
As to the Citizen Potawatomi's first claim, regarding the funding formula,
the court concluded that the absent tribes were necessary under Rule 19(a)
"[b]ecause the Citizen Potawatomis' action [could] alter the future funding for
the absent tribes."'45 Therefore, the court held that the absent tribes could
have claimed interests that were (a) related to the subject of the action,'4 6 and
(b) legally protected because all of the tribes had agreed to the formula.'47
The court reasoned that, by entering into the agreement, each tribe
transformed its interest in the funding decisions "from a mere expectation,
which is unprotected, into an interest which is protected."' 48
The Citizen Potawatomi advanced two arguments supporting its contention
that the absent tribes were not necessary parties: (1) the tribe was not
challenging the use of the formula - only its implementation, and the absent
tribes had no legally protected interest in receiving funds that were unfairly
distributed;'49 and (2) the United States could adequately represent the
interests of the absent tribes. 50 In support of the first contention, the Citizen
Potawatomi cited Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity' 5' and argued that the absent
tribes were not necessary because they did "not possess a 'legitimate interest
in continuing to receive funding allocations that are not fairly distributed."" 5 2
The court dismissed this argument because it focused on the underlying merits
of the litigation - whether the funds were unfairly distributed - a
determination which was "irrelevant under [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]
19(a)."' 53  The court reasoned that if it were required to consider the
underlying merits when determining whether the absent party possessed a
143. Id. at 1001.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 997.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 998.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 999.
151. 910 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering one tribe's action against the Secretary
of Commerce challenging regulations that govern quotas on tribal ocean fishing, the Makah
court held that the other tribes were not necessary to the action "because all of the tribes have
an equal interest in an administrative process that is lawful." Id. at 559.





"'legally protected interest,"' the Rule 19 analysis would become an
adjudication on the merits. 154 The court reiterated that "'Rule 19, by its plain
language, does not require the absent party to actually possess an interest; it
only requires the movant to show that the absent party "claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action ....."55 Therefore, the court held that Rule
19 excludes "only 'those claimed interests that are "patently frivolous .... 1 56
The court concluded that the absent tribes' claims defending the Department
of the Interior's funding method were not patently frivolous.'57
Addressing the Citizen Potawatomi's second argument, the court
acknowledged that in some cases absent tribes are not necessary parties under
Rule 19 because the federal government may adequately represent the tribes'
interests. 5 The court stated, however, that in such a situation the tribes are
unnecessary parties "only so long as 'no conflict exists between the United
States and the nonparty beneficiaries." ' 5 9 The court concluded that the
United States could not adequately represent the absent tribes because, if the
Citizen Potawatomi prevailed in the suit, some of the absent tribes might gain
funding and some might lose funding. 160 The court found that the interests of
the absent tribes were "varied and potentially conflicting."'' Thus, the court
held that the absent tribes were necessary parties to the Citizen Potawatomi' s
first claim because the absent tribes could claim an interest in the application
of the funding formulas and defendants could not adequately represent their
diverse interests.
62
As to the Citizen Potawatomi's shared service area claim, the court also
determined that one of the absent tribes was a necessary party under Rule
19(a). 163 There was no question that the Shawnee could claim a legally
protected interest in the funding received for the shared service area. 64
However, the Citizen Potawatomi argued that the court previously ruled that
the Shawnee did not share a reservation with the Citizen Potawatomi 165 and,
154. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 958 (10th Cir. 1999)).
155. Id. (quoting Davis, 192 F.3d at 958).
156. Id. (quoting Davis, 192 F.3d at 959 (emphasis omitted)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 999.





163. Id. at 1000.
164. Id.
165. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Collier, 17 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the United States had failed show that the Shawnee and the Citizen Potawatomi
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thus, the two tribes did not share a service area. 166 In response to this
argument, the court reasoned that, in its prior decision, it had held only that
the United States had failed to meet its burden of showing that the Citizen
Potawatomi and Shawnee shared a common reservation. 167 Importantly, the
court did not hold that the United States could never meet this burden.
68
Therefore, the court found that the relevant issue of whether the Shawnee and
Citizen Potawatomi share a common service area had not been conclusively
decided; thus, the Shawnee's claimed interest in the funding received from the
shared service area would not be "'patently frivolous.""' 169 The court also
determined that the United States could not adequately represent the
Shawnee's interests because the U.S. interest in implementing national Native
American policy differed from the Shawnee's interest in receiving the funds
at issue in the case. 170 Thus, the court held that the Shawnee Tribe was a
necessary party to the Citizen Potawatomi' s shared service area claim because
the Shawnee could claim a legally protected interest in the funding received
from the shared service area, and the United States could not adequately
represent that claimed interest."'
After determining that the absent parties were necessary to both claims, the
court analyzed whether the absent tribes were indispensable. It was
unnecessary for the court to analyze the feasibility of joining the tribes to the
suit because the Citizen Potawatomi did not dispute thatjoinder was infeasible
because of the tribes' sovereign immunity. 72 Thus, the court proceeded to
determine whether the suit could continue in the tribes' absence or whether
the tribes were indispensable.
2. Indispensable-Parties Analysis
"The Citizen Potawatomi argue[d] that, even if the absent tribes [were]
'necessary' [parties], they [were] not 'indispensable."", 173 As a basis for its
argument, the Citizen Potawatomi focused primarily on Rule 19(b)' s adequate
had a common former reservation).
166. Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 999.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 999-1000.
170. Id. at 1000. The court cited Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556,558 (10th Cir. 1977),
for the proposition that "[tihe national interest is not necessarily coincidental with the interest
of the Tribe in the benefits which the... agreement provides. When there is a conflict between
the interest of the United States and the interest of Indians, representation of the Indians ... is
not adequate."
171. Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 1000.
172. Id. at 997.




remedy factor. The Citizen Potawatomi argued that an adequate remedy did
not exist if the court dismissed the action and, accordingly, that it would suffer
severe prejudice.'74
The court acknowledged that, if the suit were dismissed, the Citizen
Potawatomi would be prevented from pursuing its claim in "an alternative
legal forum" because of the absent tribes' sovereign immunity.'
Additionally, the court found that no party could challenge the administrative
decisions at issue in the case because only the tribes are permitted to do so.76
However, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in holding that the absent tribes were indispensable and that
dismissal was required "even though the district court's decision meant there
is no way to challenge the conduct in question."'77 In so holding, the court
noted the "'strong policy favoring dismissal when a court cannot join a tribe
because of sovereign immunity,"" 78 the fact that "the absent tribes would
suffer substantial prejudice if the action proceeded without them[,] and [that]
there was no way to lessen that prejudice."' 79
The Citizen Potawatomi Nation case is a prime example of the numerous
cases in which courts apply Rule 19 to bar a plaintiffs suit because a third-
party tribal interest will be affected. Severe prejudice results because a
potential plaintiff with a valid claim is denied a legal forum and prevented
from seeking relief. As advocated below, the court should have factored the
government's ability to represent the absent tribes' interests into its
indispensability analysis. Additionally, the court could have employed
alternative procedural mechanisms to better serve Rule 19's interests.
VI. Analysis
Rule 19's drafters intended it to serve four individual interests: (1) the
interest of the current plaintiff; (2) the interest of the current defendant; (3) the
interest of the absentee; and (4) the interest of society "'in the orderly,
expeditious administration of justice.""' 8  However, as demonstrated by
Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton and most other cases discussed herein,
the interests of the current plaintiff and society are rarely served. This is




177. Id. at 1001.
178. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 960 (10th Cir. 1999)).
179. Id.
180. Tankersley v. Albright, 514 F.2d 956, 965 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting John W. Reed,
Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 330 (1957)).
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tribes' interests, courts dismiss suits and deny plaintiffs legal remedies
because of the prejudicial effect that ajudgment could have on the defendants
and/or the absent tribes. Thus, when determining whether to dismiss, courts
focus on (1) defendants' risk of incurring inconsistent obligations as a result
of inconsistent judgments rendered by the current court and another court in
a subsequent suit brought by an absent tribe and (2) the prejudicial effect that
a judgment rendered in a tribe's absence could have upon the tribe's claimed
interest. Such application is fundamentally unfair because it forces the
plaintiff to bear the consequences of being denied a legal remedy. Thus, the
current application does not serve the plaintiff's interest in obtaining a legal
remedy or society's interest in resolving the parties' dispute, which are
arguably more important than the interests of the defendant or the absent tribe.
As Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged two centuries ago,
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
afford that protection .... "[I]t is a general and indisputable rule,
that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."''
The remainder of this note proposes that courts can often better serve the
interests of Rule 19 by (1) giving weight to the United States' ability to
represent the interests of the absent tribe when determining whether to dismiss
under Rule 19(b) and/or (2) employing other procedural mechanisms that
could avoid the potential resulting prejudice to a defendant or an absent tribe
when the court proceeds in the tribe's absence. Furthermore, if a defendant
or tribe fails to invoke the procedural mechanisms and prevent the potential
prejudice, courts can and should discount such prejudice in determining
whether to dismiss or proceed under Rule 19(b). As such, courts can and
should allow plaintiffs' cases to proceed and avoid the severe prejudice that
results when plaintiffs are denied legal remedy. Indeed, by adopting the
application proposed herein, courts can often serve all Rule 19 interests.
181. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 66-67 (1992) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163); Bush v. Lucas, 467 U.S. 367,
373 (1983) (same); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 176-77 (1901) ("If there be an admitted




A. Courts Misapply Rule 19(b) by Failing to Give Weight to the United
States' Ability to Protect the Interests of Absent Tribes
When balancing the four Rule 19(b) factors in cases involving Indian tribes
as absent parties, courts have overlooked the federal government's ability
and/or duty to represent and defend the absent tribes' interests. The first
factor requires courts to consider the prejudicial effect of ajudgment rendered
in the party's absence; 8 2 however, the presence in the suit of a party with
similar interests may offset any potential for prejudice to an absent tribe.'83
While the vast majority of courts have found that prejudice would result to an
absent tribe,'84 these courts have failed to consider that the potential for
prejudice is significantly reduced - if not eliminated - by the government's
interest in defending its actions. The relationship between tribes and the
United States is like that of "a ward to his guardian,"' 85 and as the tribes'
guardian, the United States can sufficiently represent tribal interests to offset
the prejudicial effect of a judgment rendered in a tribe's absence.
In most cases, courts have deemed the United States' presence in the suit
insufficient to render the absent tribes "unnecessary" parties under Rule
19(a);186 however, the government's presence is relevant to a court's Rule
19(b) indispensability analysis. For example, in Sac and Fox Nation v.
Norton, 87 the court concluded, in balancing the four factors, that an absent
tribe had an economic interest in the government's actions being upheld and
that prejudice would result if the plaintiff were to prevail. 188 However, the
court properly acknowledged that "the potential of prejudice to that interest
is offset in large part by the fact that the [government's] interests in defending
[its] decisions are substantially similar, if not virtually identical, to those of
the [absent tribe]."' 89 Additionally, because the prejudice was minimal, the
court concluded that it need not analyze the second factor, the availability of
182. Citizen Potowatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 1001.
183. See, e.g., Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that, even if a tribe were a necessary party, "the potential [for] prejudice to that interest
is offset in large part" by the presence of the Secretary of the Interior and his interests in
defending his actions). See also Village of Hotvela Traditional Elders v. Indian Health
Services, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1030 (D. Ariz. 1997), which cited Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity,
910 F.2d 555,560 (9th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that "the presence of a representative may
lessen prejudice."
184. See supra note 109.
185. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
186. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
187. 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001).
188. Id. at 1259-60.
189. Id. at 1260.
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means to lessen the prejudice. 9 ' Therefore, while a potential intertribal
conflict among absent tribes prevents courts from declaring tribes to be
unnecessary parties, it does not, however, prevent courts from factoring the
United States' representation of the absent tribes' interests into its Rule 19(b)
indispensability analysis. If courts allow the suit to proceed and the
governmental defendant prevails, the judgment will not affect the interests of
the absent tribe; thus, the tribe is not prejudiced. Additionally, because the
government's interests offset the potential for prejudice, the need for shaping
relief or using other measures to lessen or avoid the prejudice is immaterial.
Thus, if courts give proper weight to the government's ability to represent
tribal interests in their indispensability analysis, the balance shifts against
dismissal. 191 As a result, courts can deem the tribe dispensable, and allow the
case to proceed.
Giving weight to the government's ability to represent an absent tribe's
interests is one way to avoid dismissing plaintiffs' cases and denying them a
legal remedy. However, as demonstrated below, other procedural mechanisms
exist whereby federal courts can further the interests of Rule 19 and still
adjudicate the present litigants' dispute.
B. Courts Overlook Procedural Mechanisms that Can Better Resolve the
Problems that Rule 19 Is Designed to Prevent
Federal civil procedure provides other mechanisms that can serve all Rule
19 interests in cases involving absent Indian tribes as necessary parties. If
applied, these proposed mechanisms will allow courts to afford the existing
parties a resolution of their dispute and avoid the prejudice that otherwise
results to the existing parties and/or the absent tribes.
1. Avoiding Prejudice to the Existing Parties
Federal courts can avoid the severe prejudice suffered by plaintiffs simply
by allowing cases to proceed rather than dismissing them under Rule 19. In
doing so, courts can afford plaintiffs legal remedy. Additionally, after
allowing a case to continue, courts can avoid defendants' risk of prejudice -
the risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations - through the
190. Id.
191. The first factor - potential prejudice resulting to the absent tribe - is offset by the
governmental defendant's presence, and the second factor becomes immaterial because the
potential prejudice is either minor or nonexistent. The fourth factor - plaintiff's lack of
remedy - always favors nondismissal because the tribes' sovereign immunity prevents the
plaintiff from suing in any forum. Thus, when the court recognizes that the governmental
defendant's presence in the suit can function to offset the potential for prejudice, the balance




following procedural mechanisms: (1) the government ability to interplead
absent tribes 92 when applicable; 93 and/or (2) the courts' ability to retain
jurisdiction over the lawsuit and to transfer and consolidate subsequent
suits."'
a) The United States' Ability to Interplead Absent Tribes
When a U.S. governmental agency is sued regarding a specific asset of the
plaintiff and one or more absent tribes, the government can involve the absent
tribes in the suit through interpleader' 95 Interpleader is a mechanism by
which defendants facing potential claims from more than one party on the
same asset are permitted to counterclaim against all potential claimants,
forcing them to participate in one lawsuit so that the court can determine all
of their rights at once. '96 Indeed, interpleader serves the same interests as Rule
19 by seeking to avoid multiple, inconsistent obligations and to provide
consistency and judicial economy. 1
97
Although the tribes' sovereign immunity includes immunity from
counterclaims and cross-claims,' the tribes cannot assert sovereign immunity
against the United States'99 or any U.S. federal agency.2° Therefore, the
federal agency can interplead the absent tribes and avoid the risk of "incurring
192. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 14, § 10.19.
193. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
194. See infra Part VI.B.I.b, which proposes that, if courts retain jurisdiction over the
present matter, subsequent suits brought by absent tribes can be consolidated under FED. R. Civ.
P. 42. If the subsequent suit is brought in a different jurisdiction, it can be transferred to the
original court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and then consolidated under Rule 42.
195. See Freer, supra note 1, at 1093-94 (stating that interpleader may be invoked in
situations where the absentee is a potential claimant to a res held by the defendant). For a
discussion on protecting the defendant when the absentee's interest is a potential claim that is
not related to a specific res, see id. at 1096-1111, which proposes an amendment to Rule 19 and
invokes" a statute mandating joinder on the basis of minimal diversity, allowing nationwide
service of process, and relaxing venue restrictions."
196. JAMES ETAL., supra note 14, §10.19, at 637.
197. Id.
198. Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1284 (D. Kan.
2002).
199. See supra note 87.
200. See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d
1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "no principle of law 'differentiates a federal agency...
from "the United States itself.... and, therefore, tribal sovereign immunity cannot be asserted
against the agency) (quoting EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir.
2001)).
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double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the
[absent tribe's] claimed interest."2"'
b) Courts' Ability to Reserve Jurisdiction over the Merits of the Original
Lawsuit and to Transfer and Consolidate Subsequent Lawsuits Brought
by an Absent Tribe
Courts can also avoid defendants' risk of inconsistent obligations by
retaining jurisdiction over the merits of the lawsuit. Such jurisdiction allows
courts to transfer and consolidate most subsequent suits brought by absent
tribes. Thus, courts can confine the litigation to one federal forum and render
one judgment encompassing the rights of all parties.
Federal courts have the authority to retainjurisdiction over a case to resolve
continuing disputes and to enter further orders as may be necessary to give
effect to the judgment or to effectuate the parties' rights.20 2 Moreover, this
authority enables the federal courts to take action against the original parties
and any new parties that can interfere with the judgment.2 °3 In fact, the courts'
201. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii).
202. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523
(1984); see also Dugas v. Am. Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414,428 (1937) ("A [supplemental] bill may
be brought in a federal court in aid of and to effectuate its prior decree to the end either that the
decree may be carried fully into execution or that it may be given fuller effect .... Such a bill
is ancillary and dependent, and therefore the jurisdiction follows that of the original suit,
regardless of the citizenship of the parties to the bill or the amount in controversy.") (citations
omitted). In Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867), the Court noted that
"'[tihe jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues
until that judgment shall be satisfied."' Id. at 171 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1 (1825)). Furthermore, the Court recognized that "'[federal courts] have authority,
therefore, from time to time, to alter the process in such manner as they shall deem expedient,
and likewise to make additions thereto .... ' Id. at 172 (quoting Bank of the United States v.
Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825)); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Missouri, 936 F.2d 993,995-
96 (8th Cir. 1991) (allowing court to retain jurisdiction in desegregation case to enter further
orders necessary to effectuate the parties' rights and to provide a quality integrated vocational
education system); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1989)
("The [District] [C]ourt explicitly retained jurisdiction over the case .... Under this ...
jurisdiction, the court repeatedly has been asked to settle disputes concerning the application
of the judgment...."); Hoffman v. Beer Drivers & Salesmen's Local Union No. 888, 536 F.2d
1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that the court does not lose jurisdiction to act if "new facts
develop" and "additional ... action by the court is required").
203. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 89 v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970)
(enjoining couple, who was not a party to the original proceeding, from sending child to school
across new boundaries established in original proceeding); Castro v. Beecher, 386 F. Supp.
1281 (D. Mass. 1975) (exercising ancillary jurisdiction over new defendants in plaintiffs' action
to enforce the original judgment rendered in the case); Miss. Valley Barge Line Co. v. United
States, 273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (finding that the federal courts' power "to enter such




ability to retain jurisdiction has been recognized as "a common sense solution
to the problems of piecemeal litigation that... arise by virtue of the limited
jurisdiction of the federal courts."20 4
By retaining jurisdiction over the merits and keeping the case on the docket,
the court retains the ability to revisit its decision in the event that an absent
tribe subsequently files suit against the defendant. If an absent tribe files suit
in the same district court, the court can simply consolidate the cases under
Rule 42.205 After hearing the parties' arguments, the court can render one
decision that applies to all parties before it. If the absent tribe files suit in
anotherjurisdiction, the defendant can have the case transferred to the original
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.206 The original court can then consolidate the
cases and revisit its prior decision. Each tribe that files suit is deemed to have
waived its sovereign immunity, thus empowering the court to exercise
jurisdiction over such tribe. 2 7 Therefore, so long as the original court retains
jurisdiction and keeps the case current on its docket, it retains the power to
adjudicate the rights of the original parties and each absent tribe that
subsequently files suit. As a result, the court can confine the litigation to one
court and render only one judgment - administering complete relief for all
of the parties.
Although courts cannot fully prevent "multiple litigation" because the
absent tribes are still permitted to file subsequent suits, this threat is not a
basis for dismissal under Rule 19. The Rule is designed to avoid the "risk of
prevent them from being thwarted and interfered with ... applies whether or not the person
charged with the violation of the judgment or decree was originally a party defendant to the
action").
204. N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 438 F. Supp. 440, 446 n.6
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (quoting 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523, at 58 (1975)).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought."
207. By initiating a lawsuit, tribes waive their immunity as to all claims, including
defendants' counterclaims that arise from the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the suit. See Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir. 1995);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1344 (10th Cir. 1982). However, the tribe
does not waive its immunity as to (1) claims that do not meet the "same transaction or
occurrence" test; (2) claims of a different form or nature than that sought by the tribe; or (3)
claims exceeding the amount sought by the tribe. Id.
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incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations, ' 20 8 not
multiple litigation.2 9 Nonetheless, courts can still limit the expense and time
associated with multiple litigation because only one court, entirely familiar
with the case, adjudicates the entire dispute although it does so in phases by
revisiting its original judgment each time a subsequent suit is filed.
Retaining jurisdiction over the merits of the case, however, will not
eliminate the defendants' risk of incurring inconsistent obligations in every
situation. As discussed in greater detail below,1 ° there are limits to the
transfer mechanism that may prevent the consolidation of subsequent suits.
First, if the federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
subsequent suit, the transfer statute 21 does not apply, and no court can transfer
the suit to the original court that retained jurisdiction. In this situation, the
absent tribe must sue in state court, 1 2 and there is no transfer mechanism that
allows for transferring cases from state court to federal court.213 It is unlikely
that the federal courts will lack subject matterjurisdiction over the subsequent
suit however, because most cases involve a federal question 214 or other basis
for federal subject matter jurisdiction. 5 Secondly, even if the federal courts
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii).
209. See Boone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 682 F.2d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 1982)
(refusing to dismiss case because of the threat of inconsistent obligations and despite the threat
of multiple litigation); see also Delgado v. Plaza Las Americanas, Inc., 139 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1998) (same).
210. See infra Parts VI.C.3-.4.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
212. If the tribe brings a subsequent suit in state court that is also within the federal courts'
subject matter jurisdiction, the case can be removed to federal court. See JAMES ET AL., supra
note 14, § 2.31, at 155-56.
213. See James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REv. 769, 897 (1999)
(acknowledging that, although cases cannot be transferred from state to federal court, so long
as the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, "removal to federal court
readily achieves the same effect").
214. Jurisdiction over federal questions is granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), which
provides jurisdiction to the federal district courts in "all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
215. In cases involving tribes as absent parties, federal subject matter jurisdiction can often
be based on the following statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), which grants jurisdiction to the
federal district courts in "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States"; 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts in cases
involving the United States as the defendant; 28 U.S.C. § 1353, which grants jurisdiction to the
federal district courts in cases "involving the right of any person, in whole or in part of Indian
blood or descent, to any allotment of land under any Act of Congress or treaty"; or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362, which grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts in "all civil actions, brought by
any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior,




will have subject matter jurisdiction, a court cannot transfer a case if the
transferee court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the litigants or the
transferee district is an improper venue. 26 This limitation may be problematic
in some situations2 7 because, if the tribe can prevent the transfer of a
subsequent suit, the defendant is exposed to the risk of incurring inconsistent
obligations. As such, neither the defendant nor the court can avoid such
prejudice.
2. Avoiding Prejudice to the Absent Tribes by Intervention
When a court allows plaintiffs' suits to proceed in the absence of a
necessary tribe, the tribe can avoid the potential resulting prejudice - the
prejudicial effect on the tribe's legally protected interest of a judgment
rendered in the tribe's absence - by exercising its right to intervene under
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.21 ' "Intervention" is a
procedure by which an absent party can enter into litigation commenced
between others to protect its interests.219 However, in doing so, the intervenor
agrees to be bound by the judgment and is afforded standing to appeal if the
judgment is adverse to its interest, regardless of whether the original parties
choose to appeal.
22 1
By recommending intervention as a mechanism that better serves Rule 19
interests, this note does not intend to attack tribal sovereign immunity.
Rather, the analysis focuses on the current parties before the court. Rule 19
should not serve as a barrier that prevents the parties from obtaining justice
simply because an absent tribe claims an interest in the suit but refuses to
States." However, diversity of citizenship cannot serve as a basis for federal subject matter
jurisdiction in cases involving Indian tribes. See Am. Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain
Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that neither the tribes nor their
unincorporated entities can be sued in diversity because Indian tribes are not citizens of any
state within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000) and, therefore, the presence of a tribe
destroys complete diversity).
216. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.33, at 160 (stating that transfer is proper only if
"the defendants would have been subject to venue and service of process").
217. See infra Part VI.C.4.
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1)
when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
219. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 14, § 10.17, at 626.
220. Id. § 10.17 & n.2.
2003]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
participate. The rule's twin goals are complete resolution of the parties'
dispute and avoidance of multiple or piecemeal litigation.22" ' The rule
recognizes, however, that situations exist in which an absentee's presence
destroys the court's jurisdiction and renders joinder infeasible.22 Rule 19
cannot, however, "in equity and good conscience 22 3 contemplate allowing an
absent third party that claims an interest in the suit to prevent the current
parties from obtaining justice. Indeed, while the Rule certainly allows tribes
to exercise their immunity and avoid the lawsuit, it allows the current
"willing" parties to go forward. Furthermore, if the tribe wishes to participate
and protect the tribal interests at stake, it can do so by intervening under Rule
24. Thus, intervention is a procedural mechanism that complements Rule 19
and allows courts to better serve Rule 19 interests.
Under Rule 24(a), an absentee has the right to intervene when a statute
confers the right or when:
the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is
so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.224
Thus, the test for determining whether an absent party has the right to
intervene is identical to the one used to determine if an absent party is a
"necessary" party under Rule 19(a)(2)(i). 225 Further, unless the federal court's
jurisdiction is based on diversity,226 there are no barriers to the tribe's
221. See HB Gen. Corp. v. Manchester Partners, L.P., 95 F.3d 1185, 1198 n.9 (3d Cir.
1996).
222. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) ("A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be
joined as a party in the action .... ) (emphasis added).
223. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
224. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
225. See Freer, supra note 1, at 1078 & n.87.
226. Neither tribes, nor their unincorporated entities, can sue or be sued in diversity. See
Am. Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that Indian tribes are not citizens of any state within the meaning of § 1332(a)(1) (2000) and,
therefore, the presence of a tribe destroys complete diversity); Ninigret Dev. Corp. v.
Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Ci. 2000) (holding that "the
presence of an Indian tribe destroys complete diversity" because "[an Indian tribe... is not
considered to be a citizen of any state"); Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997);
Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1993); Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v.
Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[I]t is clear that an Indian tribe is not a citizen




intervention because supplemental jurisdiction will support it."' A tribe with
the right to intervene clearly satisfies the U.S. Supreme Court's requirement
that the claims arise "from a common nucleus of operative fact."228 Therefore,
if the court determines that a tribe is a necessary party under Rule 19(a), the
tribe clearly has the option to intervene and protect its own interests.22 9 If the
tribe intervenes, the court can avoid not only the prejudice that may result to
the tribe, but also the defendant's risk of inconsistent obligations by
adjudicating the rights of all the parties in one action.
The interests of Rule 19 are better served if the litigants, tribes, and courts
employ the procedural mechanisms proposed herein rather than simply
dismissing plaintiffs' lawsuits. However, if the litigants fail to cooperate,23°
such procedural mechanisms are unable to prevent the prejudice that may
Indian tribes can incorporate themselves using one of two methods: (1) tribes can incorporate
or charter a corporation under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 477
(2000), or (2) tribes can incorporate under their own tribal laws. See Am. Vantage, 292 F.3d
at 1094 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002). Also, any subentity of the tribe can incorporate under local state
law. Id. Consequently, once a tribe or subentity of the tribe incorporates, it becomes a "citizen"
of the state in which it resides just as any other corporation. Id.
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (granting supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that
"form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution...
includ[ing] claims that involve... intervention of additional parties"). The statute was enacted
to clarify and consolidate the doctrines of ancillary jurisdiction, pendent claim jurisdiction, and
pendent party jurisdiction. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.28, at 144.
228. See JAMES AT EL., supra note 14, § 2.28, at 145 (quoting United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). The full statement from United Mine Workers reads:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.
But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiffs
claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then ... there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
Id. (quoting United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725). Furthermore,
[t]he statute was meant to restore the broader Gibbs concept of supplemental
jurisdiction by extending jurisdiction to claims sufficiently related to those claims
within the federal courts' original jurisdiction to fall within 'the same case or
controversy under Article II of the Constitution,' that is, to press supplemental
jurisdiction to its constitutional limits.
Id. § 2.28, at 146.
229. Naturally, the absent tribe must be notified of the pending litigation and its ability to
intervene to protect its rights; otherwise, it cannot intervene and, therefore, would be denied the
opportunity to protect its interests. Thus, once the court determines that the tribe is a
"necessary" party, the court should order that the tribe be given notice of the pending suit and
its right and opportunity to intervene. Upon expiration of an appropriate time period given for
the tribe to intervene, for example, thirty days from the date of receiving notice, the court should
proceed in the tribe's absence.
230. For example, the government fails to interplead an absent tribe, an absent tribe chooses
not to intervene, and/or litigants prevent the transfer of a subsequent suit.
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result to a defendant or absent tribe. As shown below, however, when these
failures occur, the proposed mechanisms can function to identify the party
responsible for the resulting prejudice and allow the court to discount such
prejudice when determining whether to dismiss or proceed under Rule 19(b).
C. When the Proposed Procedural Mechanisms are Available to the Party
that May Be Prejudiced if the Suit Proceeds, Courts Should Discount that
Factor When Determining Whether to Dismiss Under Rule 19(b)
While the mechanisms proposed herein can resolve the majority of Rule 19
problems in cases involving absent tribes, four primary situations may still
present problems: (1) the governmental defendant fails to employ interpleader
when applicable; (2) the tribe refuses to intervene; (3) the federal court
reserves jurisdiction, but the subsequent suit is outside the federal courts'
subject matter jurisdiction; or (4) the defendant or tribe prevents transfer of
a subsequent suit. In a majority of these instances, the party that may be
prejudiced if the court proceeds is also the party that fails to employ the
available procedural mechanisms to avoid such prejudice. Therefore, in such
cases, a court could discount the potential resulting prejudice when
determining whether to dismiss under Rule 19(b). If, after discounting such
prejudice, courts determine that the factors weigh against dismissal, they
should declare the absent tribe dispensable and allow the case to proceed
rather than deprive the plaintiff of a legal remedy.
1. The United States Fails to Interplead
In cases in which the United States has the ability to interplead the absent
tribes,231 the government can protect its interests in avoiding the risk of
incurring inconsistent obligations by requiring absent tribes to participate and
defend their interests. However, in such cases, the government has a greater
incentive to move for dismissal under Rule 19 rather than interplead the absent
tribes because, if the court grants the motion, the government avoids the
litigation altogether, and the plaintiff is forced to bear the consequences of
being denied a legal forum. In such cases, therefore, courts should deny the
Rule 19 motion and allow the case to proceed. Once the motion to dismiss is
denied, the government will likely interplead the absent tribes and allow the
court to adjudicate the rights of all parties in one suit. Interpleading the absent
tribes is in the government's best interest because it avoids not only the risk
of inconsistent obligations but also litigation expenses. Therefore, if the
government interpleads the absent tribes, the court can discount the prejudice
that may result if the plaintiff's case proceeds.




2. Absent Tribe Refuses to Intervene
Rule 24 intervention only functions to eliminate the risk of prejudice to the
tribe and the defendant if the tribe chooses to intervene. Absent an act of
Congress, a court cannot force a tribe to intervene because intervention
requires a waiver of sovereign immunity.232 Indeed, if courts could force
tribes to intervene under Rule 24, they could also force tribes to join under
Rule 19. Thus, when a tribe claims immunity, intervention will not further
Rule 19 interests. However, the tribe's sovereign immunity should not deny
justice to the parties before the court. As stated above,233 intervention is
recommended as a complement to Rule 19 to allow courts to proceed in the
tribe's absence and provide justice to the current parties. Although courts
hold that the tribe's ability to intervene does not lessen prejudice when the
tribe asserts its sovereign immunity and refuses to intervene,2 34 courts should
consider that the tribe can intervene if it so chooses. The current parties,
however, do not have the ability to litigate their dispute in an alternative forum
if the court dismisses the case. Thus, courts should be less concerned with the
harm or prejudice that may result to the tribe and more concerned with the
current parties' interest in litigating the dispute and society's interest in the
administration of justice. When courts proceed in the tribe's absence, they
can protect defendants' interests in avoiding the risk of inconsistent
obligations by reserving jurisdiction over the merits of the case and utilizing
the transfer and consolidation mechanisms discussed above.235 Therefore,
because the tribe possesses the ability to intervene, courts should discount the
potential prejudice resulting from a judgment rendered in the tribe's absence
when determining whether to proceed or dismiss under Rule 19(b).
3. Federal Court Reserves Jurisdiction but Subsequent Suit Is Outside
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The proposed transfer and consolidation mechanisms cannot serve the
interests of Rule 19 if the subsequent suit brought by the absent tribe falls
outside of the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. In the absence of
such jurisdiction, the tribes must bring such actions in state court and
232. See Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir.
1994).
233. See supra Part VI.B.2.
234. See Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
tribe's ability to intervene is insufficient to lessen prejudice if it requires waiver of sovereign
immunity).
235. See supra Part VI.B.I.a.
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defendants are unable to remove to federal court.23 6  Therefore, before
determining whether to proceed or dismiss under Rule 19(b), courts should
assess whether the subsequent suits will fall within federal subject matter
jurisdiction. If not, then courts cannot discount the potential prejudice to
defendants when determining whether to dismiss or proceed. However, if
courts conclude that the subsequent suits will fall within federal subject matter
jurisdiction, they should discount the resulting prejudice to the absent tribe or
defendant because, even if the subsequent suit were originally filed in state
court, the defendant can have the action removed to federal court and
transferred and consolidated with the original action. 37 However, as
discussed below, courts cannot discount the potential prejudice to the
defendant in all cases because, even if the subsequent suit were removable,
tribes can prevent transfer.
4. Federal Court Reserves Jurisdiction but Tribe or Defendant Prevents
Transfer of Subsequent Suit
Although federal courts can protect the interests served by Rule 19 by
retaining jurisdiction over the merits of the case and transferring and
consolidating subsequent suits filed by the absent tribes, situations exist in
which courts cannot transfer a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. This statute
provides that federal district courts can transfer a case "to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." 3' Thus, transfer is improper if
the transferee court (1) does not have personal jurisdiction over the litigants
239
or (2) is an improper venue.240 However, the litigants themselves must raise
objections to personal jurisdiction and venue.24' Thus, the objecting litigant
236. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.31, at 156 (stating that the jurisdictional
requirements are applicable to removal and, therefore, that an action is removable only if it
"would have been maintainable in federal court").
237. If the controversy falls within the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, then
defendants can remove the case to federal court. See id. § 2.31, at 155-56. Once the case is
removed, defendants can transfer the case to the original district where the court retained
jurisdiction, unless the tribe prevents transfer by raising a personal jurisdiction or venue
objection. Defendants are responsible for the risk of incurring inconsistent obligations if they
fail to remove the case to federal court. For the procedures governing removal, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446 (2000). See also JAMES ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.31.
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
239. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.33, at 160 (noting that defendants must be subject
to service of process in transferee court or transfer is improper).
240. Id. (noting that venue in transferee district must be proper or district is not one in which
the action might have been brought).
241. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (stating that defenses of improper venue and lack of personal
jurisdiction are waived if they are not raised in the defendant's answer or preliminary motion);




who prevents the transfer is responsible for the potential resulting prejudice.
As a result, unless the original suit involves a tribe as the plaintiff or more
than one tribe as necessary and indispensable parties, the courts cannot
discount the prejudice that may result when determining whether to dismiss
or proceed under Rule 19(b). The tribal plaintiff in the subsequent suit may,
and likely will, object to transfer and expose the defendant to a risk of
inconsistent obligations. Neither courts nor defendants will be able to prevent
such risk of prejudice.242
It is clearly in defendants' best interests to waive their objections and to
allow courts to transfer the case to the original district and prevent the risk of
incurring inconsistent obligations.243 However, the absent tribe will most
likely have incentive to prevent transfer in the subsequent suit because, if the
tribe had agreed with the original court's judgment, it would not have brought
the subsequent suit. Thus, it is unlikely that the absent tribe will want the
original court to adjudicate its subsequent suit. Therefore, unless the original
court can be certain that it can exercise personal jurisdiction over the tribe and
that its district is a proper venue for the subsequent suits, the court cannot
discount that prejudice when making its Rule 19(b) determination because
neither the defendant nor the court will be able to avoid the risk of
inconsistent obligations.
If the case involves a sovereign plaintiff and/or more than one absent tribe
however, the defendant can avoid the risk of incurring inconsistent obligations
by moving to dismiss the subsequent suit under Rule 19 if the tribe prevents
transfer. In such a situation, the sovereign plaintiff or other absent tribe from
the original suit will be necessary and indispensable parties to the subsequent
suit for the same reasons that the tribe was a necessary and indispensable party
jurisdiction, venue, and service of process must be included in the defendant's answer or
preliminary motions or they are waived forever).
242. If the case involves only one absent tribe and not a sovereign plaintiff, the defendant
could not move for dismissal under Rule 19(b) because there is not an absent party whose
joinder is infeasible. The plaintiff from the original suit is the only absent party that is necessary
and indispensable and, unless the plaintiff possesses sovereign immunity, he cannot prevent
joinder. In this situation, retaining jurisdiction over the original suit and amending its judgment
to conform with the one rendered in the subsequent suit is the only way that the court can
prevent the defendant from incurring inconsistent obligations. However, in this situation, there
is no orderly, expeditious administration of justice. Therefore, unless the original suit involves
a sovereign plaintiff or more than one absent tribe, courts cannot discount the prejudice to the
defendant when determining whether to dismiss or proceed under Rule 19(b).
243. While the defendant likely will not have an objection on personal jurisdiction grounds
because the transferee court must have had personal jurisdiction over him to have adjudicated
the original suit, the defendant can conceivably object on venue grounds. If the defendant does
so, however, he is responsible for the resulting prejudice - the risk of incurring inconsistent
obligations.
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to the original suit. Moreover, joinder will be infeasible because of sovereign
immunity. Furthermore, when determining whether to dismiss, the court in
the subsequent suit can discount the resulting prejudice to the tribe, such as
being denied a legal remedy, when making its Rule 19(b) determination
because the tribe had the opportunity to intervene in the original suit but failed
to do so.2" Consequently, the court in the subsequent suit can dismiss the
case rather than expose the defendant to a risk of inconsistent obligations. 45
Therefore, in such cases, the original court can discount the prejudice that may
result to the defendant when determining whether to dismiss under Rule 19.
In sum, unless (1) the original court is certain that the absent tribe cannot
prevent the transfer of subsequent suits by objecting to personal jurisdiction
or venue, or (2) the original suit involves a sovereign plaintiff or more than
one absent tribe, the original court cannot discount the resulting prejudice to
the defendant when determining whether to dismiss or proceed under Rule 19.
In such circumstances, the court cannot serve the Rule 19 interests by
reserving jurisdiction over the merits of the suit and employing the transfer
and consolidation mechanisms because these mechanisms cannot avoid
potential prejudice to defendants.
As demonstrated herein, situations may arise where a defendant or absent
tribe fails to employ the suggested procedural mechanisms to eliminate the
potential prejudice that may result if the case were to proceed in the tribe's
absence. However, in these instances, courts can discount the resulting
prejudice to the responsible party. By doing so, courts can allow plaintiffs'
cases to proceed more frequently, and, as a result, better serve the Rule 19
interests.
244. In fact, had the tribe intervened in the original suit, the subsequent suit would not exist
and neither the defendant nor the tribe could incur any prejudice because the court would have
adjudicated the rights of all parties in the original suit. By intervening, the tribe would have
waived its sovereign immunity and agreed to be bound by the original court's judgment.
Therefore, the subsequent suit would have been barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel,
See Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that
absent tribes "are not bound by [the court's] ruling under principles of resjudicata or collateral
estoppel," unless they are parties to the suit).
245. Although such a result is exactly the sort that this note seeks to prevent - dismissing
the suit and leaving the plaintiff without a legal remedy - in this situation, the plaintiff tribe
is responsible for the court denying it a legal remedy because the tribe's objections prevented
the court from transferring the case to the original court. By allowing transfer, the tribe could





D. Looking Back at Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton: An Application
of the Proposed Procedural Mechanisms to an Actual Rule 19 Situation
The following section of this note applies the suggested procedural
mechanisms to the facts of Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton. As
demonstrated below, the Rule 19 application proposed herein will better serve
the interests of Rule 19.
1. The United States' Ability to Protect the Interests of the Absent Tribes
When balancing the Rule 19(b) factors, the Citizen Potawatomi Nation
court failed to give sufficient weight to the government's ability to represent
the absent tribes' interests. Although the court properly acknowledged that
the government could not represent the interests of each absent tribe so as to
render the tribes unnecessary,246 the government's interest in defending its
actions was sufficient to offset the prejudice that could result to the absent
tribes. In affirming the lower court's dismissal, the court relied on the
"'strong policy favoring dismissal when a court cannot join a tribe because of
sovereign immunity. "247 However, such "strong policy" is not so compelling
as to eliminate the need to consider all four Rule 19(b) factors. 248
Had the Citizen Potawatomi Nation court acknowledged that the
government's presence would offset the potential prejudice, the balance of the
factors would have weighed against dismissal. The potential for prejudice
existed because, if the Citizen Potawatomi had prevailed, the "action [would
have] alter[ed] the future funding for the absent tribes., 24 9 However, the court
gave no weight to the fact that, if the case had proceeded and the Secretary of
the Interior had successfully defended his actions, the administration formula
would have remained the same, and the absent tribes would not have been
prejudiced at all. Therefore, the Secretary's ability to defend his actions
would have offset the potential prejudice to the absent tribes and, as a result,
the first and second factors would shift against dismissal.250 Additionally, the
court itself acknowledged that the fourth factor - the absence of an
alternative remedy - weighed against dismissal because sovereign immunity
246. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 2001).
247. Id. at 1001 (quoting Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 960 (10th Cir. 1999)).
248. See Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951,960 (10th Cit. 1999) (holding that, although
there is a "strong policy that has favored dismissal when a court cannot join a tribe because of
sovereign immunity," such policy does not abrogate the application of Rule 19(b)).
249. Citizen Potawatami Nation, 248 F.3d at 997.
250. See Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
that, because the potential for prejudice is offset by the government's presence, both the first
and second factors weigh against dismissal).
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prevented any party from challenging the Secretary's decisions."' Therefore,
if the resulting balance of factors weighed against dismissal, the court should
have declared the absent tribes "dispensable" and proceeded to adjudicate the
Citizen Potawatomi's claim.
2. The United States' Ability to Interplead the Absent Tribes
In Citizen Potawatomi Nation, the Secretary of the Interior also had the
ability to interplead the four absent tribes into the lawsuit. The government
had appropriated a set amount of funds annually for the tribes' use in planning
and administering the programs,252 and the five tribes had negotiated a formula
for the Secretary to use in determining how to divide the funds. 53 The
formula divided 100% of the appropriated funds among the five tribes.254
Thus, the government possessed a specific asset - the appropriated funds -
to which one or more parties - the five tribes - claimed an interest.
Therefore, the situation clearly satisfied requirements for invoking
interpleader. Moreover, because the defendant was a federal government
agency, the absent tribes could not have asserted their sovereign immunity to
prevent the Secretary from interpleading them into the suit.2" Consequently,
the Secretary could have required the absent tribes to participate in the suit
and eliminated the threat of prejudice to the absent tribes as well as his own
risk of incurring inconsistent obligations.
3. The Absent Tribes' Ability to Intervene
Each of the four absent tribes in Citizen Potawatomi Nation possessed the
right to intervene under Rule 24. The court specifically found that (1) the
absent tribes claimed an interest in the subject of the action;256 (2) disposition
in the tribes' absence would impair that interest;257 and (3) the Secretary could
251. Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 1000 ("Clearly, sovereign immunity prevents
the Citizen Potawatomi from pursuing these claims in an alternative forum. Moreover, if the
Citizen Potawatomi cannot challenge Defendants' administrative decisions, then no one can.")
(citation omitted).
252. Id. at 995.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 996 (stating that the tribes agreed to split 25% of the funds equally; 25% in
proportion to total tribal enrollment; 25% in proportion to resident tribal enrollment within each
tribe's jurisdictional area; and the remaining 25% of the funds were split in proportion to the
amount of trust property in each tribe's jurisdiction).
255. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
256. Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 997 (finding that the tribes had a legally
protected interest in receiving funds as computed by the Secretary).
257. See id. at 1001 (finding that the Citizen Potawatomi's action may alter the funding




not adequately represent the tribes' interests.2" 8 Indeed, it was for these
reasons that the court deemed the absent tribes "necessary" parties under Rule
19(a). 259 Therefore, assuming that they were notified of the suit, the absent
tribes clearly had the opportunity to intervene and defend their interests in
receiving funding under the current formula applied by the Secretary. Had the
tribes intervened, the court could have adjudicated the rights of all the parties
and eliminated the potential for prejudice to the tribes and the risk of
inconsistent obligations to the governmental defendant.
4. The Availability of the Transfer and Consolidation Mechanisms
Had it allowed the Citizen Potawatomi's suit to continue in the other tribes'
absence, the district court in Citizen Potawatomi Nation could have employed
the transfer and consolidation mechanisms to protect the defendant from
incurring the risk of inconsistent obligations. If the court had adjudicated the
dispute and reserved jurisdiction over the merits of the case, it could have
consolidated all subsequent suits brought by the absent tribes into the original
action. If the absent tribes subsequently filed suit in the same district - the
Western District of Oklahoma - the court could have merely consolidated the
actions under Rule 42.2' Alternatively, if the tribes subsequently filed suit in
a different district, this district court could have transferred the case back to
the Western District of Oklahoma under 28 U.S.C. § 1404,261 where the court
would have consolidated the case under Rule 42.262 Furthermore, if the
subsequent suits were filed in state court, the defendant could have removed
the cases to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 because, as the court
specifically acknowledged, federal subject matter jurisdiction existed under
28 U.S.C. § 1362,263 which grants the federal district courts jurisdiction over
"all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe ...wherein the matter in
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.,,264 Thus, the federal court would have had subject matter jurisdiction
over all subsequent suits brought by the absent tribes against the Secretary.
Therefore, the Secretary could have removed the suits to federal court and,
258. Id. at 999.
259. Id. (holding that the absent tribes were necessary parties because the "[d]efendants ...
sufficiently demonstrated that the absent tribes [could] claim an interest in the application of the
funding formulas and that [d]efendants cannot adequately represent their varied interests").
260. FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
262. FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
263. Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 248 F.3d at 995 ("Subject matter jurisdiction was asserted
under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 in that the action was brought by an Indian tribe ... and the matter in
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.").
264. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000).
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upon such removal, could have transferred the suits to the Western District of
Oklahoma and had them consolidated. Furthermore, if the absent tribes had
objected to the transfer on personal jurisdiction or venue grounds, the
Secretary could have moved to dismiss the subsequent suits under Rule 19(b).
The Citizen Potawatomi or any of the other absent tribes would have been
necessary and indispensable parties to the subsequent suit because of their
interest in the funding, and their sovereign immunity would have rendered
joinder infeasible. After discounting the prejudicial effect that dismissal
would have on the plaintiff tribe,265 the court could have dismissed the
subsequent suits and avoided the Secretary's risk of incurring inconsistent
obligations. Therefore, the defendant or the absent tribe could have avoided
any resulting prejudice, and the court could have discounted such prejudice
and allowed the Citizen Potawatomi's suit to proceed. As such, the transfer
and consolidation mechanisms could have better served the Rule 19 interests.
As demonstrated by the foregoing factual analysis of Citizen Potawatomi
Nation, litigants and courts alike can employ the procedural mechanisms
proposed herein to better serve the Rule 19 interests. Indeed, had the Citizen
Potawatomi Nation court given proper weight to the federal government's
ability to represent the interests of the absent tribes, the government invoked
interpleader, the absent tribes intervened, or the court proceeded with the case,
rendering judgment as between the current parties but reserving jurisdiction
over the merits, all Rule 19 interests2" would have been served: (1) the
plaintiff could have pursued a legal remedy; (2) the defendant could have
avoided the risk of inconsistent obligations; (3) the absent tribes could have
defended their interests in the current administration of the funding formula;
and (4) society would have had orderly, expeditious administration of justice.
VII. Conclusion
Federal courts should change their application of Rule 19(b) in cases
involving absent Indian tribes as necessary parties under Rule 19(a) as
proposed herein. In many cases, courts can and should allow the suit to
proceed rather than dismissing and forcing the powerless plaintiff to suffer all
the consequences. By allowing the plaintiffs' cases to proceed, courts will be
265. The court could discount the prejudicial effect that dismissal would have on the plaintiff
tribe because the tribe (1) failed to intervene in the original suit and (2) is the objecting party
that is preventing the suit from being transferred to the original jurisdiction where the suit could
be litigated.
266. The rule serves three classes of interests: (1) the interests of the present parties, (2) the
interests of potential but absent plaintiffs or defendants, and (3) society's interest in the orderly,





serving the interests of the present parties, society, and the absent tribes.
Indeed, by adopting the application proposed herein, the courts can better
serve all of the Rule 19 interests. Rule 19 cannot, "in equity and good
conscience,"2 67 allow an absent third party that claims an interest in the suit
to completely prevent the current parties from obtaining justice.
Nicholas V. Merkley
267. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
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